

Differentiating between Partner Capacity Building Efforts for Counterterrorism and Counternarcotics Missions

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Contents

List of charts	iii
Introduction.....	1
Comparing strategic guidance.....	2
DOD vs. non-DOD guidance.....	2
DOD guidance regarding counterterrorism and counternarcotics	4
Key finding	6
Comparing partner nation capabilities.....	7
Key finding	11
Conclusion	14

List of charts

Chart 1: Comparing counterterrorism and counternarcotics strategies.....	3
Chart 2: DOD guidance for counterterrorism and counternarcotics.....	5
Chart 3: Partner nation capabilities needed to conduct counterterrorist and counternarcotics operations	9
Chart 4: Capabilities required of partner nation security forces.....	10
Chart 5: Capacity building programs related to 1206 and their appropriate missions, according to DOD guidance.....	12

Introduction

The U.S. military routinely provides training, equipment, and financial assistance to foreign militaries in support of common security objectives. The U.S. Congress has directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to focus some of its partner capacity building efforts in specific mission areas, such as counterterrorism and counternarcotics.¹

Periodically, Congress and senior DOD leaders request updates and assessments of ongoing partner capacity building efforts. In some instances, these assessments can be clear and straightforward. In other circumstances, such as when there are multiple assistance programs for a given country, or where the mission-focus of capacity building efforts overlap, it can be difficult to distinguish among the missions and/or desired partner nation capabilities that DOD partner capacity building efforts support.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense, Global Security Affairs, Partnership Strategy Office asked CNA to consider the partner nation capacity building elements of two DOD missions: counterterrorism and counternarcotics. CNA was asked to assess the areas of overlap and distinction between partner capacity building efforts for these two mission areas. The sponsor expressed a special interest in how the overlap between these two missions affects the application of funding for partner capabilities under the DOD Section 1206 authority.² The sponsor also requested that the study pay special attention to partner nation capacity building within Latin America, the area of responsibility (AOR)³ of U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM).

CNA approached this problem in two ways. First we compared DOD and non-DOD strategic guidance for U.S. actors/agencies involved in foreign partner capacity building efforts for counterterrorism and counternarcotics. By examining both U.S. military and other U.S. government guidance for both missions, we were able to examine strategic or conceptual overlap and/or distinctions across U.S. government counterterrorism and counternarcotics efforts. Second, we examined the operational capabilities that DOD partner capacity building efforts in support of counterterrorism and counternarcotics entail. This enabled us to consider whether meaningful and traceable distinctions exist between the operational capabilities needed by partner militaries for carrying out counterterrorism and counternarcotics missions.

¹ For example, Congress allocates funding for partner nation assistance in support of counternarcotics activities via Sections 1004 and 1033 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), and the International Narcotics Control program authorized by Section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act. Congress allocates funding for partner nation assistance related to counterterrorism via other channels, such as the "Global Train and Equip" authority of Section 1206 of the 2006 NDAA.

² Section 1206 of the 2006 NDAA creates a program allowing DOD to spend its own funds to train and equip foreign militaries to undertake counterterrorism or stability operations.

³ Area of responsibility, or AOR, is the more common term for the geographic area designated as the responsibility of a U.S. combatant command. SOUTHCOM, however, uses the term area of focus to emphasize the importance of U.S. partnership across the region and to avoid connotations of unilateralism.

Comparing strategic guidance

DOD vs. non-DOD guidance

The first step in our analysis is to compare closely the U.S. strategic guidance for international counterterrorism and counternarcotics efforts. We sought in particular to identify areas of coincidence and distinction in the definitions of official U.S. policy regarding these missions.

One major challenge to comparing the international components of the U.S. counterterrorism and counternarcotics missions is that they are led by different federal agencies. The DOD leads U.S. international efforts against terrorism. Several agencies support these efforts, including the Department of the Treasury, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department of State (DOS), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

The Department of State leads U.S. international efforts against narcotics, via its Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the Department of the Treasury, and the DOD all provide support for international counternarcotics efforts. The DOD manages only 6 percent of the federal counterdrug budget.⁴

The fact that DOD leads the development and execution of U.S. international counterterrorism strategy and that DOS leads the development and execution of U.S. international counternarcotics strategy complicates the comparison of strategic and policy statements relevant to spending on partner nation capacity. These agencies approach these two missions from different conceptual positions.

The cognitive model behind the DOD's strategy against terrorism is that of military action against a threat to U.S. national security. The objectives of U.S. counterterrorism strategy are broad and existential; they include *the defeat of terrorists* and the denial of what terrorists require *to survive*. By contrast, the cognitive model behind the DOS counternarcotics strategy is that of law enforcement and the curtailing of civilian activities. This is reflected in the fact that counternarcotics strategic guidance generally prohibits U.S. support for actions or equipment that can be lethal.⁵

Both strategies are broadly defined. The breadth of their strategic objectives is such that both strategies include virtually all areas of military *and* governmental operations and services. For example, DOD counterterrorism strategy includes the objective to:

⁴ DoD, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics website accessed November 2008. https://www.defenselink.mil/policy/sections/policy_offices/solic/cn/index.html.

⁵ These documents include Section 1033 of the 2008 NDAA [P.L. 110-181]), the INL International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, March 2008, (pages 45-58); and SOUTHCOM's unclassified description of its counterdrug/counterterrorism support and operations (available at the SOUTHCOM website: <http://www.southcom.mil/AppsSC/pages/counterNarco.php>. Date of last access 22 December 2008.

“Contribute to the *establishment of conditions* [author’s note: economic, political, social] that counter ideological support for terrorism”, while INL counternarcotics strategy includes the promotion of alternative crops and livelihoods (i.e., economic development) and narcotics demand reduction strategies. Both counterterrorism and counternarcotics strategies include—in addition to improving military and law enforcement capabilities and cooperation with U.S. forces—cooperation in intelligence gathering and sharing, financial regulation, legal and judicial matters, economic development, and infrastructure improvements.

The following chart compares elements of U.S. national counterterrorism and counternarcotics strategies:

Chart 1: Comparing counterterrorism and counternarcotics strategies

Strategy	Lead agency	Supporting agencies	Cognitive model	Objectives
Counterterrorism	DOD	Dept. of Treasury, CIA, DOS, DHS	Military-centered actions against a national security threat	Deny, defeat, and eliminate terrorists
Counternarcotics	DOS/INL	DEA, DOD, Dept. of Treasury	Law enforcement actions against civilians	Reduce benefits from narco trafficking; stop, seize, and detain narco traffickers

The differences in approach, scope, and focus between DOD and DOS strategic guidance are notable. They are designed for different audiences, and pursue seemingly distinct objectives. However, these distinctions are not easy to discern once this guidance is turned into partner capacity building programs.

The ambiguity in distinguishing between partner nation capacity building for counterterrorism and for counternarcotics derives from several factors:

- **Similar skill sets.** The same skills and capabilities of partner nation security forces⁶ are or could be applied to either mission;⁷
- **Similar equipment.** The same equipment and resources are or could be used by partner nation forces to conduct either mission; and
- **Use by terrorists of money derived from narcotics.** The two missions are interrelated because money from narco trafficking can, and has been, used to support terrorist activities. Therefore any activities that reduce narco trafficking also potentially reduce funding for terrorism.

⁶ The term *security forces*, in this document, includes both military and law enforcement.

⁷ Although across the Americas counternarcotics is considered primarily a law enforcement mission, and counterterrorism primarily a military or national security issue, in practice military forces across the region are increasingly involved in both. This is partly due to the interrelationship between the two threats, and partly to the limited resources and equipment typical of security and law enforcement forces in the region.

The following section takes a closer look at DOD programs to expand partner capacity in these mission areas, in order to illuminate areas of overlap and distinction at the strategic and conceptual levels.

DOD guidance regarding counterterrorism and counternarcotics

As this study is focused on DOD-related international cooperation and support, we chose to compare strategic guidance documents related to counterterrorism and counternarcotics from the Department of Defense. These documents are: 1) the Joint Chiefs' of Staff *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*;⁸ and 2) the DOD counternarcotics policy as described on the website of the Office of Counternarcotics Policy, and from a memorandum by the Office of the Deputy Secretary of Defense in July 2002.⁹

Chart 2 summarizes the strategic objectives from each of these documents, and aligns them vertically to indicate areas of overlap and dissimilarity.¹⁰ Sections shaded in green indicate overlap in DOD's strategic objectives concerning each mission. Sections of the strategy or policy that are irrelevant to international partners (such as the section of counternarcotics policy that pertains to reducing drug use by DOD personnel) have been omitted.

⁸ *National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism*, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 February 2006.

⁹ DOD policy is available at: http://osd.dtic.mil/policy/sections/policy_offices/solic/cn/policy.html. Last access date 21 December 2008. It can also be found in the Memorandum SUBJECT: Department of Defense Counternarcotics Policy, 31 July 2002, signed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz.

¹⁰ We altered the sequence from the original counternarcotics policy in order to align them meaningfully alongside their equivalent in the counterterrorism list.

Chart 2: DOD guidance for counterterrorism and counternarcotics

Areas of overlap	DOD counterterrorism strategic guidance	DOD counternarcotics strategic guidance
Build partner capacity	Deny terrorists what they need to operate and survive	<i>No equivalent strategic objective</i>
	Enable partner nations to counter terrorism	Programs that: Support foreign military and law enforcement counternarcotics activities
Defeat the threat	Support U.S. efforts to deny WMD/E proliferation, recover and eliminate uncontrolled materials, and increase capacity for consequence management	<i>No equivalent strategic objective</i>
	Defeat terrorists and their organizations	Supply reduction programs: Detection and monitoring programs that integrate military, United States law enforcement agency, and foreign capabilities against illegal air and maritime drug shipments to the U.S. These programs will use: Military command, control, communications, and intelligence resources Military operational planning capabilities that support the interdiction of suspected drug shipments.
	Counter state and non-state support for terrorism in coordination with other US government agencies and partner nations	<i>No equivalent strategic objective</i>
	Contribute to the establishment of conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism	<i>No equivalent strategic objective</i>

The comparison of these strategic objectives raises several considerations.

- **Partner nation capacity building is a DOD strategic objective within both missions.** The parameters of capacity building are undefined in the case of counterterrorism, but counternarcotics policy identifies the following areas of focus for U.S. defense integration with foreign capabilities: a) Military command, control, communications, and intelligence resources, and b) Military operational planning capabilities that support interdiction.
- **There are strategic objectives that do not overlap.** DOD's policy for international counternarcotics efforts has no equivalent to the following strategic objectives for DOD's international counterterrorism efforts: deny terrorists what they need to operate and survive; the control of WMD/Es and related materials; countering state and non-state support for terrorism; and contributing to the establishment of conditions that reduce ideological support for terrorism.
- **Counterterrorism involves a broader range of objectives and types of permitted force.** Countering state and non-state support for terrorism, and contributing to the establishment of conditions that counter ideological support for terrorism both entail actions far beyond the traditional purview of the DOD. DOD counternarcotics policy focuses more narrowly on the detection and monitoring of illegal drug shipments and their interdiction, and makes no mention of actions involving the lethal use of force.¹¹

Key finding

The objectives of DOD's international counternarcotics strategy are subsumed under DOD's international counterterrorism strategy. Comparing DOD strategic guidance clearly indicates that U.S. international counterterrorism strategy is broader in scope than DOD's international counternarcotics strategy. The two threats are in fact interrelated. Money gained through the sale of narcotics has, in many cases, been funneled to support activities related to terrorism.¹² To the extent that money from the sale and trafficking of narcotics can go to support terrorist groups, the counterterrorism objective "Deny terrorists what they need to operate and survive" logically includes all

¹¹ This distinction is reinforced by the exception, approved by Congress in Section 1033 (assistance for counterdrug operations and capabilities) of the 2004 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 108-136), that Section 1033 assistance to Colombia's armed forces may be used for both counternarcotics and counterterrorism missions.

¹² For example the FARC, Colombia's largest insurgency group, is included in the U.S. State Department list of foreign terrorist organizations. The FARC also supports itself in large part by overseeing the cultivation, refinement, and sale of coca, and by extorting payments from others involved in these activities within FARC-controlled territory. See the article "United States Charges 50 Leaders Of Narco-Terrorist FARC In Colombia With Supplying More Than Half Of The World's Cocaine," U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, 22 March 2006 (<http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/pressrel/pr032206a.html>. Last access date 20 December 2008.). See also the United Nations World Drug Report 2007, pages 174-177 (available at: <http://www.unodc.org/pdf/research/wdr07>. Last access date 20 December 2008.)

counternarcotics operations. Furthermore, language in the 2002 Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum makes the relationship with counterterrorism explicit: "The Department will focus its counternarcotics activities on programs that: ... Contribute to the war on terrorism."

Comparing partner nation capabilities

The second step of our analysis is to compare the capabilities that DOD indicates that partner nation security forces require in order to cooperate effectively in both mission areas.¹³ The aim is to identify, if possible, differences in these capabilities according to DOD guidance and practice.

This task is complicated by the lack of any universally applicable guidance (from the DOD or any other U.S. government agency) regarding partner nation capabilities required to cooperate effectively against terrorism or narcotics.¹⁴ In counterterrorism and in counternarcotics, each partner nation possesses a unique geographic, demographic, and socio-economic situation. Each partner nation also has its own degree and type of capabilities and vulnerabilities, and each faces a unique set of threats. We found that lists of partner nation requirements are typically drawn up on a case-by-case basis by the relevant combatant command (COCOM) with support from in-country DOD personnel from Military Groups and Military Attachés offices. Therefore, there simply is no single list of ideal capabilities that all partner nations should have to execute either of these missions.

This should not come as a surprise, because the contours of bilateral and multilateral cooperation are different for each partner and each relevant COCOM. The U.S. does not desire all partners to possess full capabilities equal to those of the U.S. military. Partnership is predicated on the joint and collaborative use of capabilities and resources. U.S. military assistance aims to provide its partner nations with equipment and assets that allow it to cooperate more effectively, not necessarily to be operationally independent.

In the absence of universal DOD guidance, CNA derived its own list of capabilities that partner nations need in order to conduct counterterrorism or counternarcotics operations in collaboration with U.S. forces. We derived this list from several DOD strategic or policy guidance documents, previous analyses in this area conducted by CNA and other

¹³ We focus on the capabilities required for kinetic, operational, military or law enforcement actions. We do not include considerations of partner nation capacity building that are unrelated to traditional security operations, for example administrative reforms, judicial or legal process or procedures, the promotion of economic development, etc.

¹⁴ The closest such list we found were the Mission Essential Task Lists produced by the branches of the U.S. armed forces and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We considered using as a basis for our analysis the JCS Universal Joint Tasks List (UJTL), from July 2002 (CJCSM 3500.04C). We decided against this for two reasons. First, because Mission Essential Task Lists can be assumed to be different for partner nations, acting collaboratively with U.S. forces and assets, than for U.S. forces themselves. Second, because the UJTL from 2002 are outdated, and do not include several tasks that, in 2008, are clearly required for effective counterterrorist operations.

research organizations, in-house subject matter expertise, and a review of recent SOUTHCOM-hosted capacity building exercises related to these missions.¹⁵ These general areas of capability, each of which is required to some degree to conduct effective counterterrorism and counternarcotics operations, are:

- Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I);
- Surveillance and monitoring;
- Force presence or mobility; and
- The ability to intercept, neutralize, seize, or eliminate a target.

The achievement of each of these capabilities requires specific types of training and equipment. What follows are lists of the types of assets and training most required of partner nations in order to cooperate effectively with U.S. forces against terrorism and/or narcotics. These are not exhaustive lists. Nor are they meant to capture the full range of capabilities that the U.S., for example, has developed for its own forces. The following are the requirements that U.S. assistance tends to address in partner nation capacity building within the SOUTHCOM AOR.

¹⁵ Our list of required capabilities reflects the substance of the most recent multinational exercises hosted by SOUTHCOM: 1) PANAMAX (2008) focused around a hypothetical terrorist attack on the Panama Canal. PANAMAX 2008 was chiefly maritime but included air, land, and special operations components. The focus was on improving interoperability; maritime interdiction and boarding, visits, and search and seizure; C4I with aircraft patrol and multinational command; and on-land command and control and stability operations. 2) FUERZAS COMANDO (2008) is a special operations multinational competition, which includes joint training in assault operations and sniper competitions. 3) TRADEWINDS (2008) focused on maritime safety, maritime search and rescue missions, and maritime law enforcement.

Chart 3: Partner nation capabilities needed to conduct counterterrorist and counternarcotics operations

<i>C4I typically requires the following types of assets and their associated operational training:</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Equipment that allows secure voice communications; • Equipment that allows land-sea-air direct connectivity; • Computers and equipment that allow data sharing, especially across agencies and partner nations, and joint rules, procedures, and practice in their use; and • Specialized units and equipment for different types of intelligence gathering capabilities, such as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • HUMINT (human intelligence) • SIGINT (signals intelligence) • IMINT (imagery intelligence).
<i>Surveillance and monitoring typically require the following types of assets and training:</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Surveillance via aircraft, maritime vessel, and/or foot patrol; and • Surveillance via radar.
<i>Force presence and mobility typically require the following types of assets and training:</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Equipment enabling the transport of personnel, including helicopters, cargo and personnel transport aircraft, trucks, and boats, and training in their use; • Infrastructure to support such transport, including airports, helicopter pads, roads, etc.; and • Operational support, including logistics, supply, and maintenance capabilities.
<i>The ability to intercept, neutralize, seize, or eliminate a target typically requires the following types of assets and training:</i>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The training and equipping of special operations forces with special technical skills, such as maritime or air interdiction operations, jungle combat and survival, and precision shooting; • The training and equipping of riverine forces, especially small, shallow-draft boats, and training in their use; • Equipment enabling nighttime operations, and training in their use.

If we return to the DOD strategic guidance for counterterrorism and counternarcotics missions presented in Chart 2, it is clear that these capabilities: 1) pertain to strategic objectives for both missions, as elements of partner nation capacity building, and 2) fall within the range of activities labeled “defeat the threat.”

Below, Chart 4 focuses on this range of activities and demonstrates two key findings. The first is that in terms of operations, there is complete overlap between the capabilities required of partner nations in order to cooperate in counterterrorism and counternarcotics operations. The execution of both missions generally involves the gathering and use of intelligence, the identification and monitoring of targets, communications among

different divisions and forces, the ability to mobilize resources, and the capacity to interdict and respond to threats.

The second finding, however, is that DOD guidance states that *only* the support of C4I and surveillance and monitoring capabilities are strategic objectives *of both missions* (as indicated by green shading). Force presence or mobility, and the ability to intercept, neutralize, seize, or eliminate a target are capabilities that only counterterrorism strategy includes as strategic objectives. These partner nation capabilities (indicated in lighter shading) are *not recognized by DOD as areas for counternarcotics support*.

Chart 4: Capabilities required of partner nation security forces

Capabilities required for counterterrorism	Capabilities required for counternarcotics
Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I)	Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I)
Surveillance and monitoring	Surveillance and monitoring
Force presence or mobility	Force presence or mobility
The ability to intercept, neutralize, seize, or eliminate a target	The ability to intercept, neutralize, seize, or eliminate a target

This comparison of partner nation capabilities raises several important considerations.

- **In terms of operations, there is complete overlap between the capabilities that partner nation security forces require to conduct counterterrorism and counternarcotics missions.** Both missions require similar sets of capabilities, and the related skilled personnel, procedures, equipment, and assets. This is especially true in the cases of many partner nations in the SOUTHCOM AOF, where the principal difficulty is a shortage of operational capacity. When a nation's security forces have very few patrol boats or helicopters in operation, for example, these assets will be used in response to any threat situation. In many cases, whether a target is involved in narco trafficking, terrorist activities, or both only becomes clear during the investigation after the target is apprehended.
- **According to DOD guidance, only C4I and surveillance and monitoring are partner nation capabilities relevant to, and to be supported for, both counterterrorism and counternarcotics.** According to the July 31, 2002

memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense (SUBJECT: Department of Defense Counternarcotics Policy), DOD counternarcotics policy *does not* include assistance to partner nations in the actual interdiction and related activities, including force mobilization. DOD policy includes programs to support “military operational planning capabilities that support the interdiction of suspected drug shipments,” but not the interdiction itself. We interpret “planning capabilities” as included in the category of C4I, which regards the collection and use of information, its interpretation, and the communication of resulting policies or command decisions.

Key finding

DOD guidance distinguishes between the types of partner nation capabilities for which it can provide assistance in support of counterterrorism and counternarcotics efforts. DOD guidance only recognizes as a strategic objective for counternarcotics efforts the promotion of capabilities related to C4I and surveillance and monitoring. For counterterrorism, DOD guidance recognizes a wider range of necessary capabilities. In other words, assets, equipment and training that support partner nation security forces’ operations in the areas of force presence or mobility, and the interception, neutralization, seizure, and elimination of targets, are part of DOD international counterterrorism efforts, but are *not* part of DOD international counternarcotics efforts.¹⁶

This distinction has implications in regard to linking partner nation capacity building programs to their appropriate DOD funding streams. Chart 5 applies this distinction to 1206 funding for the years 2006 and 2007.¹⁷ In this chart we present all the partner nation capacity building programs requested for those years, the countries to which they pertain, and our interpretation whether these programs fit within the strategic objectives of DOD’s counterterrorism mission, its counternarcotics mission, or both. This categorization is meant to be suggestive of the type of evaluation possible using the differences in guidance we have identified. It is not meant to be definitive.

According to DOD guidance, 55 percent of 1206 funding requests in those years involve support for capabilities that DOD views as supportive of strategic objectives of both counterterrorism and counternarcotics missions. 32 percent of requests fall into the category of support for capabilities that DOD recognizes as part of its strategic objectives regarding counterterrorism, but not counternarcotics (i.e., related to force presence or mobility, or to the interception, neutralization, seizure, and elimination of targets).

¹⁶ This contrasts with Congressional authorization, which in 2008 expanded Section 1033 (counternarcotics) authority to include the provision of patrol boats and nonlethal specialized equipment for use during interception, neutralization, and seizure operations. Congress maintained the prohibition against the provision or support of equipment or activities that could result in intended civilian fatalities, but did not differentiate between partner nation capabilities that should or should not be supported.

¹⁷ FY 2006 requests extracted from General Accounting Office report number GAO-07-416R, entitled *Section 1206 Security Assistance Program—Findings on Criteria, Coordination, and Implementation*, released 5 March, 2007. FY 2007 programs obtained from a working paper provided by OSD Policy, Partnership Strategy division.

Fourteen percent of requests, as worded in project descriptions, are insufficiently defined to allow categorization.¹⁸

Chart 5: Capacity building programs related to 1206 and their appropriate missions, according to DOD guidance

Partner nation capabilities supported using 1206 funds during fiscal years 2006 and 2007	Partner nation(s)	Alignment of capabilities with DOD guidance for counterterrorism, counternarcotics, or both
FY 2006		
Interoperable communications and computers (with training) to establish joint maritime command, control, and communications architecture	Panama, Dominican Republic	Both
Purchase of commercially available equipment for improved regional maritime awareness	Nigeria, São Tome and Principe	Both
Promotion of stability	Nigeria, São Tome and Principe	CT
Enhancement of counterterrorism capabilities	Nigeria, São Tome and Principe	Capabilities unspecified
Development of an integrated maritime surveillance system	Indonesia	Both
Improvement of government's control over its territory	Lebanon	CT
Development of rotary wing assets capable of expediting the receipt, analysis, and dissemination of intelligence	Pakistan	Both
Facilitation for rapid planning and execution of counterterrorist special operations raids	Pakistan	CT
Development of counterterrorism maritime security capability	Sri Lanka	Capabilities unspecified
Establishment of an intelligence fusion hub to support maritime operations	Thailand	Both
Creation of a secure multinational information sharing network helping countries to act on information and disrupt terrorist activities	Trans-Saharan African countries	Both
Improved capabilities to prevent cross-border arms trafficking and the suppression of terrorist activity	Yemen	CT
FY 2007		
Expand air force capabilities to reduce ungoverned space	Lebanon	CT
Development of naval capability to disrupt maritime terrorist activity	Bahrain	CT
Enhancing the effectiveness of the counterterrorism analysis cell within the intelligence directorate	Bahrain	CT
Improve border surveillance and patrol	Pakistan	Both
Building interdiction capabilities and expansion of nonlethal force options	Pakistan	Both
Enhancing border security capability	Yemen	Both
Improve naval headquarters' ability to accept and track radar feeds from coastal radars and to share information	Indonesia	Both

¹⁸ Percentages do not total 100 percent due to rounding.

Improving C4 capabilities and developing maritime domain awareness	Indonesia	Both
Provision of hi-speed data imagery sharing network to increase situational awareness and enable information sharing	Indonesia	Both
Providing a common operating picture via provision of radar	Malaysia	Both
Provision of CENTRIX stations to develop common operating picture and improve ability to pass data via secure voice system	Malaysia	Both
Provide basic maritime interdiction capabilities	Philippines	CT
Provide high frequency radios for improved command and control (C2)	Philippines	Both
Boat training to improve abilities to interdict illegal maritime traffic	Sri Lanka	CT
Building new light infantry companies to disrupt terrorist activity	Chad	Both
Building tactical airlift capability to improve ability to track and disrupt terrorist operations	Chad	CT
Improving military intelligence capabilities	Trans-Saharan countries	Both
Improve maritime security	West African countries	Capabilities unspecified
Improve capacity to provide niche and core counterterrorism capabilities	Balkan countries and Ukraine	Capabilities unspecified
Enhance capabilities to deter and contain terrorist elements	East African countries	Both
Improve capability to detect, track, identify, and share information on maritime traffic, and interdiction	Djibouti	Both
Building capacity to target underlying causes of terrorism and enhance coordination with U.S. government agencies	Chad, Mauritania, Nigeria, Senegal	CT
Build communications interoperability	Chad	Both
Light infantry train and equip, creating rapid reaction force	Mauritania	CT
Enhancing maritime domain awareness	Indonesia	Both
Provision of radars to increase the effectiveness of maritime patrol aircraft	Malaysia	Both
Increasing capability for long-range patrol	Philippines	Both
Improving interdiction capabilities via use of UH-1 aircraft	Philippines	CT
Extending range of surveillance aircraft	Sri Lanka	Both
Instruction in U.S. military tactics, techniques, and procedures for combating terrorism	Mexico	Capabilities unspecified
Developing brigade size stability operations unit	Kazakhstan	CT
Improve maritime counter terrorism capabilities focused on western border area and coast	Pakistan	Capabilities unspecified

We derived our categorization of programs as either related to counterterrorism or related to both counterterrorism and counternarcotics missions by comparing the capabilities each program supported against the list of capabilities that pertain to the two missions according to DOD guidance (see Chart 3). In some cases, program descriptions are not specific about the actual capabilities they support. We labeled these cases as *Capabilities unspecified*. For example, neither “improve maritime counter terrorism capabilities,” “improve counterterrorism capabilities,” nor “instruction in U.S military tactics,

techniques, and procedures for combating terrorism” identifies the actual partner capability affected. Because of their description we assume these programs support capabilities that are related to counterterrorism. However, without more specificity we cannot determine if the actual capability is related only to counterterrorism or to counternarcotics as well. In order to allow clear categorization, these program descriptions would need to be more specific regarding the types of equipment and/or training they provide.

Conclusion

CNA was asked to consider the partner nation capacity building elements of two DOD missions, counterterrorism and counternarcotics, to assess overlap and dissimilarities between these missions, and to distinguish components of partner nation capacity building that are related to either one or the other mission, or to both. Our principal findings are as follow.

1. In terms of operations, there is complete overlap between the capabilities that partner nation security forces require to conduct counterterrorism and counternarcotics missions. This is especially true in the case of most Central American and Caribbean nations, where the threats of terrorism and narcotrafficking are interrelated and the capacities of local forces are low. In these countries any increase in operational capacity improves those forces’ counterterrorism and counternarcotics capabilities to a near equal degree.
2. A comparison of DOD strategic guidance demonstrates a distinction between the types of partner nation capabilities for which DOD can provide assistance in support of counterterrorism efforts and those for which it can provide assistance in support of counternarcotics efforts. Current DOD guidance promotes partner capacity building in C4I and intelligence and surveillance capabilities for both mission areas. However, it is only in the counterterrorism mission area that DOD guidance for partner capacity building covers the capability to interdict targets or capabilities that may be lethal in nature.
3. It is possible to identify the mission relevance of a capacity building program if we can identify the specific partner capabilities it supports. In order for DOD to distinguish the mission relevance (i.e., counterterrorism or counternarcotics) of partner capacity building programs, and to explain programs’ appropriateness for different funding channels, program proposals and descriptions should identify the capabilities they support as specifically as possible.
4. Absent the clear identification of partner capabilities that DOD programs support, the distinction between capacity building programs that pertain to counterterrorism and those that pertain also to counternarcotics can only be established by the stated intent of the program.